The early start of the process of bank restructuring and privatization in Hungary provides a longer and richer amount of evidence than that available for any other transition economy. This paper analyzes the dynamic of bank restructuring in Hungary with a focus on the role played by foreign ownership. It explores the performance over time of foreign owned Hungarian banks and studies the extent to which efficiency gains are affected by the chosen acquisition strategy -strategic acquisition versus greenfield investment -or by the management style adopted after the acquisition. This paper, therefore, supplements previous results on the effects of foreign bank ownership in three ways. First, it explicitly considers the time span required for the change of ownership to affect bank performance. Second it explores how important for the success of an acquisition is the chosen acquisition strategy, and, third, how relevant to this end is the adopted management style, as proxied by the degree of reliance on foreign management. JEL classification numbers: F23, G21,G34
1.
Introduction.
A growing body of empirical evidence has shown the positive impact that foreign ownership has on banks' performance in developing and in transition economies.
Seldom, though has the analysis focused on the dynamics of bank performance following the change in ownership. How long does it take for the new management to be able to affect the different parameters of bank performance? and which parameters are foreign owners most likely to affect? And finally are these effects dependent from the mode of entry? These are questions that need to be answered in order to better understand the chain of events through which foreign ownership eventually affects bank efficiency of the host country. Although a relatively large amount of empirical evidence has been analyzed for mature economies much less is known about foreign ownership in emerging countries 1 .
There are several reasons for which there is scant empirical evidence on the channels through which foreign ownership affects banks performance. Uneven data quality, or lack of comparable data over sufficiently long sample periods have been an obstacle to detailed empirical tests based on large cross countries datasets. On the other hand, analyses focused on individual country experiences cannot easily disentangle the effects of foreign ownership on bank efficiency from those of other concurrent financial reforms. This paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of the effects of foreign ownership on individual banks' performance by looking closely at the experience of one country -Hungary -that presents particularly desirable features from the perspective of a case study. Hungary had, in fact, an early start in the transition process toward a market economy and was one among the first countries to allow foreign ownership of its banks. As a result, Hungary appears to be the only transition economy for which an econometric analysis could be based on a sufficiently long string of good quality data while at the same time keeping to a minimum the disturbance effects of simultaneous major banking reforms.
The first part of this paper (sections 2 to 4) provides an overview of the main features of the changes in bank corporate governance in Hungary over the 1990s. It sets out the main descriptive evidence and provides the motivation and a guide to the testing strategy to be followed in the second part of the paper.
More specifically, we shall discuss the environment in which bank reforms took place and their timing (section 2), the process of foreign banks entry in Hungary (section 3) and the performance records of different groups of foreign owned banks (section 4). In particular, we shall explore the effects associated with different forms of foreign presence (diffuse or strategic, related to a "green-field" investment or to the acquisition of a preexisting concern) and with different productive choices (concentrated on niche markets or on wider business segments).
The second part (Sections 5 and 6) verifies whether the descriptive evidence and the conjectures discussed in the previous sections possess indeed a statistical significance and can withstand econometric tests. Over the sample of 26 commercial banks active in the period 1994-2000 we test whether foreign ownership has significantly affected cost efficiency (as measured by operating costs and by number of employees over assets), profit efficiency (as measure by pretax profits over assets and by lending spreads) or bank development (as measured by loan growth) and over what time intervals. In addition, we tests how efficiency gains have been affected by the chosen acquisition strategystrategic acquisition versus green-field investment -or by the adopted management style -majority of foreigners in the board of directors or appointment of a foreign CEO. After controlling for macroeconomic developments and for bank specific features we find that all these aspects have played a statistically significant role in affecting the success or failure of different acquisition strategies in the Hungarian market. While our results are specific to the Hungarian case, the detailed characterization of the efficiency gains associated with the presence of foreign ownership may not be unique to the Hungarian experience and may be of more general interest.
Overall, this paper supplements previous results on the effects of foreign bank ownership in three ways. First, it explicitly considers the time span required for changes of ownership to affect the acquired banks' performance. Second it examines the impact of the chosen acquisition strategy on different measures of bank efficiency, and, third, it seeks to answer to the question of whether the reliance on foreign or domestic management has differential impact on bank efficiency.
Development and Reform of the Hungarian Banking Sector.
The The other main trend in the modernization of Hungarian banking was the emergence of the two-tier system, which went together with the birth of new institutions.
Hungary was the first CEE country that modernized its financial sector by creating a twotier banking system, more adapted to the market environment 2 . Parallel with this process small specialized financial institutions were developed from funds that had been pooled 2 The new system, set up on January 1 1987, led to the spin-off of the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB), the The Act on Credit Institutions allowed banks to conduct investment banking activities -that the 1990 Act on Securities restricted to authorized security dealers onlythrough wholly-owned subsidiaries. So notwithstanding an organizational separation, commercial banks could engage in investment banking. This institutional segregation was gradually abolished after 1997: commercial banks were first licensed for government securities transactions, and then for the full range of investment banking in 1999.
The increase in the number of market players, the appearance of foreign owners and the liberalization of banking enhanced competition, but problem loans inherited from the past increased dramatically due to the financial problems faced by enterprises during the accelerated reforms process started in the early 1990s. The Bankruptcy Act introduced in 1992 worsened the situation. By 1992, the fast growth of bad loans became one of the most critical obstacles to the operation of the Hungarian banking system. The fire fighting "loan consolidation program" did not bring about the desired long term improvement in the positions of either the banks or their debtors. Therefore, further "bank and the debtor consolidation programs" were implemented in 1993 and 1994 3 .
The "loan consolidation program" (which included the acquisition by the government of bad debts of banks) led to considerable short term improvement in the position of the banking system (Balassa, 1996) . Capital adequacy ratios were increased.
However, the benefits of loan consolidation did not last long. The portfolios retained by the banks continued to deteriorate because of more rigorous criteria of classification and poor debtor positions. Without addressing ownership and management problems the key issues of banks' under-capitalization could not be solved.
In spite of portfolio cleaning, the total problem loan portfolio in the banking system kept increasing and by the end of 1993 it reached 29 per cent of the outstanding loans of banks, 16 per cent of total banking assets and 12 per cent of GDP. Due to the related provisioning requirements, many state owned banks became technically insolvent.
The government led re-capitalization effort brought government share of bank equity over 75% in 7 of the 8 concerned banks.
The new bank consolidation agreements defined at the end of 1993 imposed more stringent performance requirements on bank managers. Each bank had to develop a strategy to improve operating costs, rationalize organization and loan classification procedures, and credit rating systems. Subject to the achievement of these objectives, a new re-capitalization was completed by the end of 1994. The program had mixed success. Problem loans (substandard, doubtful or bad loans) gradually were reduced both in absolute terms and as a share of total assets (Table 1) , although, total loans of these banks decreased at an even higher rate due to more rigorous lending criteria.
Consequently the level of commercial and industrial loans of banks involved in 3 See Bonin, 1994, Várhegyi, 2001. consolidation programs decreased in 1995, notwithstanding an inflation rate close to 20%. The share of commercial and industrial loans over total bank assets decreased from 22% to 19% during the consolidation period. (Várhegyi, 2001) .
A second scheme has been followed by the Hungarian authorities with the partial sale in the summer of 1995 of the largest retail bank, National Savings and Commercial Bank (OTP). By forbidding the presence of strategic investors, by preserving a 25 percent stake in public hands and by promoting a prevalent domestic ownership, the Government wished to create a diversified proprietary structure, dominated by institutional investors.
Overall, the privatization of the Hungarian banking system was practically completed by the end of 1997. By that time state ownership had dropped to 21 per cent of bank capital while the foreign stake had increased to over 60%. At the end of 2000 state ownership had dropped to 19% while the foreign stake had increased to over 66% (Table   2 ). If we exclude Postabank that went through a severe crisis and required new public funds in 1998 and two small banks whose privatization failed, only banks with specific public functions have remained in public hands (Eximbank, Hungarian Development Bank, Land Credit and Mortgage Bank).
Foreign banks ownership in Hungary
The whole process of bank restructuring and reforms relied on and, to a large extent, has been characterized by the important role that the Hungarian authorities invited foreign banks to play and that was actively pursued though a liberal entry policy and a deliberate emphasis on the presence of strategic investors in bank privatizations. The Act on Financial Institutions, enacted at the end of 1991, to a large extent was in conformity with European standards (Várhegyi, 1996b) . Table 3 ).
By 1997 the number of banks operating with majority foreign ownership had grown to 30
with over 50 per cent of total assets. By the end of the year 2000 foreign controlled banks accounted for over two thirds of the total assets (Table 4) .
Foreign Investors Entry Strategies.
The great majority of the foreign shareholders in Hungarian banking are strategic investors. In some cases, multilateral finance organizations (EBRD, IFC) temporarily held minority stakes in the privatized banks. The different motivations with which foreign banks entered the Hungarian market was reflected in diverse business strategies.
A key motive was to serve internationally active corporate clients that had acquired an interest in Hungary. Owing to the early opening up of the Hungarian economy, the number of foreign and multinational firms began to soar in the late 1980s (see Farkas, 1999) . Several West European banks founded subsidiaries here (and in other East
European countries) so that they could provide high-quality services to these companies and their foreign employees on the spot (for instance, Germany's Commerzbank or Credit Lyonnais of France).
Another important factor of market entry was represented by the growth opportunities that Hungary as a host country, presented or appeared to present. The growth opportunities of less developed East European markets meant excellent opportunities to generate higher profits than in mature home markets. This was the strategy pursued by the Austrian banks, which in view of past historical and cultural relations, had an in depth knowledge of the Hungarian market. CA and Raiffeisen earned most of their profits in the eastern markets in the 1990s. The key element in this strategy was the acquisition of low-risk customers and large-volume transactions (multinationals, Hungarian monopolies such as the oil or the telecommunications company), which helped to push down costs (Ábel and Székely, 1994) . In other cases the intention was simply to secure presence, in view of possible future expansion in Hungary or in other neighboring transition economies 4 .
Foreign investors strategies were also conditioned by governments policies. Until 1994, the critical year of the Government's privatization strategy, purchase of existing banks was limited only to minority shareholders (see Inter-Európa Bank, Postabank).
Banks were put on sale for strategic investors only after the portfolio cleaning that began in 1994. All foreign banks participating in the privatization sought majority (or even exclusive) stakes, reflecting their role of strategic investors. This is confirmed by the fact that the new owners effected substantial capital increases, and made large investments in information technology and network development (Várhegyi, 1999) . As for the investment strategy between the 1980s and 1990s 25 foreign owners opted for a greenfield investment and 11 preferred to purchase existing banks. Two-thirds of the market entries had taken place before 1995 (Table 5 ).
The strategy of entering the Hungarian banking market may also have been affected by the period of entry, with early entrants choosing green-field investment in light of more favorable opportunities to conquer important market shares. In addition to the considerable success in expanding their positions on the market as a whole (Table 6 ), many green-field institutions turned out to be very successful in specific market segments: notably corporate and investment banking.
Market saturation, lower than expected growth, and increased competition led to a decline in the number of green-field investments after 1995. In addition, bank strategies in Hungary started reflecting the large-scale M&A activity in developed countries banking systems. Foreign banks entering the market in the second half of the 1990s sought, in the first place, to fill in market niches: as in the case of 'car banks', credit institutions specializing in consumer loans and home loans were established.
Selection of management styles.
Under Hungarian company law, the board of directors is responsible for mediumterm strategy, while the supervisory board serves to control the operation on behalf of the shareholders. The management, under the leadership of the chief executive office, who also sits on the board, is responsible for the day-to-day operation (see Bonin and al., 1998) . The Hungarian banking legislation stipulates that at least two of the directors shall be Hungarian citizens, and at least two shall be employed by the bank. Some of the foreign strategic investors employed Hungarian nationals as CEO or as chairman of the board, while others preferred to second experts from the parent bank to hold the top positions in the Hungarian subsidiaries.
The choice between the two strategies often did correlate with the nationality of the owners: Austrians, Germans and Italians, who are more familiar with the Hungarian situation, entrusted local managers with management more often than others (e.g.
Americans or Asians). The former often relied on the stock of bankers who had gained relatively up-to-date knowledge in the international division of NBH, the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank, or the foreign subsidiaries or representations of NBH in the 1980s (see Várhegyi, 1996a) .
The performance of foreign banks in Hungary.
Foreign-owned banks achieved varying degrees of success in Hungary. Generally, banks established as green-field investment and controlled by strategic owners performed better than the privatized banks, including those controlled by strategic investors . This indicates that a crucial factor affecting bank performance lies in the nature of inherited problems as reflected in different entry procedures.
At the same time, not all green-field investments produced the expected results. In quite a number of cases even several years of operation did not lead to the right measure of profitability. This has been the case for banks which could not earn a sufficient market share, and did not operate as a specialized financial institution (e.g. car finance) or in a narrow market segment (consumer lending).
It is easier to understand the reasons of success and failure if banks are classified according to performance and to owner strategy. Of the 23 banks that have been under foreign control for at least five years, 10 can be classified as well-performing organizations. The majority of them were created as green-field investment. Only three banks, among those privatized through a foreign acquisition, have shown improvements in terms of market share and efficiency. Well-performing banks can be split into four groups according to the owners' investment and market strategy:
• Green-field investments, successfully expanding on a wide market (CIB, Raiffeisen, BA-CA, Citibank) • Green-field investments that have grown into successful niche banks (Porsche and Daewoo), and BNP, which operates successfully on a rather small market • Successful banks privatized for strategic investors (HFTB, ÁÉB)
• The successful large bank OTP, held by foreign portfolio investors as minority shareholders.
Poorly performing banks can instead be split into two groups, based on their entry and governance features:
• Green-field investments that have achieved a moderate performance (ING, Commerzbank, HypoVereinsbank, Volksbank, IC)
• Banks sold to strategic investors which show a moderate or poor performance (ABN Amro, K&H, Budapest Bank, Takarékbank, Erste, Hanwha, IEB, WestLB) Table 7 summarizes the average performance of the individual groups in 1996-2000 according to certain profitability indicators 5 . In terms of profitability and costeffectiveness the green-field banks showed a better combined performance than privatized institutions, notwithstanding the higher interest margins earned by the latter.
The main reasons for the poorer results of the privatized banks are higher operating costs, and more importantly, the higher provisioning costs. The latter explains why differences in total profitability ratios, as measured by ROA and ROE, are much larger than those associated with operating income and costs.
The parent banks of the majority of the green-field banks are capital-rich institutions with strong positions and good performance internationally (e.g. Citibank,
ING, Commerzbank). A common feature of the green-field banks that have achieved an outstanding performance and a good market position is a long-standing presence on the Hungarian market: three out of four were active in Hungary since the 1980s, and also the fourth also has been operating for more than a decade.
Early market entry enabled these banks to build up a core clientele, particularly of large corporations, in a period when competition was much weaker (Claessens and al., 2000, Király and al., 2000) . Later, in the second half of the 1990s, when expansion became impossible in the corporate market segment, banks reoriented their focus towards retail banking, though for high-income customers (e.g. private banking). Only Citibank 5 Two of the five years, notably 1998 and 1999, were affected adversely by the Russian financial crisis, which hit many banks, not so much because of loans advanced to Russian banks and companies, rather because of failures among Hungarian firms that export to Russia. The banks also suffered huge losses in securities transactions.
pursued a different market/product strategy by offering "quality" retail services in
Budapest since the early 1990s, relying on the growing expatriate population.
Successful green-field banks have shared similar corporate governance features.
In three of the four successful ones, foreign owners made good use of the expertise of local managers, and laid emphasis on local demands and opportunities, as opposed to a strong reliance on the parent company management and organizational patterns.
The poorer than average performers, among privatized banks, represent a rather Among the ten banks sold to strategic investors only two were able to achieve good results: HFTB in the hands of the Bayerische Landesbank, and ÁÉB, purchased by Russia's Gazprom. The key to HFTB's success appears to be the choice of the German owner to employ qualified Hungarian bankers to shape the bank's strategy and to manage the organization, while the bulk of ÁÉB's earnings was generated on the Russian interbank market.
The poor performance of the majority of privatized banks is a consequence of the bad legacy represented by high operating costs and above-average reserves, which are related to inefficient branch network, underdeveloped IT, and low-quality clientele.
Several internationally reputed owners tried to replicate without success strategies already pursued in more developed countries.
Higher profitability, when achieved, has come from the joint effect of higher interest margins and lower operating costs and smaller provisioning costs. In this respect, the Hungarian experience seems to be at odds with the general evidence that on average foreign banks are able to reduce the size of the intermediation margins. Among privatized banks only green-field ones were, in fact, able to achieve significantly lower interest margins (see Table 7 ).
5.
The estimation procedure and the data. We use as dependent variables a set of five Efficiency and Activity Indicators Control Variables (BCV) we have included a size variable, given by the logarithm of total assets, the leverage ratio, given by the ratio of equity over total assets, and a profitability indicator, the net interest income ratio over total assets.
The three sets of variables describing foreign ownership specific features are composed as follows. The first set, intends to catch the effects of the Duration of Foreign Ownership (DFO) and is given by four different dummies (FORCON n ) that take value 1 when foreign control has lasted for at least n years (with n going from 1 to 4 years) and zero elsewhere; we also considered a modulated dummy equal to the logarithm of the number of years elapsed since the beginning of foreign ownership. Foreign control is defined as an ownership share equal to or larger than 50 per cent of outstanding equity. We use both fixed effects and random effects regressions to allow for bank specific effects, according to the results of the Hausman test. The estimation results are reported in Tables 9-13. The test for the relevance of the different types of initial investment is based, instead, on a stacked OLS regression. This approach was required to avoid the problems generated by the collinearity of the FIT dummy variables with bank specific dummies. The estimation results are reported in Table 14 .
The sample period starts in 1995, the year following the definition of the privatization strategy, and includes the following six years until the year 2000. It covers 26 commercial banks, for a total number of observations that, according to the different specifications, is between a minimum of 122 and a maximum of 156. We note that because of serious, and atypical restructuring problems, the observation relative to Postabank in 1998 were eliminated from our sample. Table 8 provides some descriptive statistics about the variables in the estimation sample. Banks in our sample were on average adequately capitalized with an average leverage ratio of 12% but some of them experienced capital shortages. Net interest income represented on average 5% of total assets, operating costs 4% and returns 1%.
The average volume of intermediated funds per bank employee is equal to 100 million of Hungarian Forints and the mean value of the lending spread (average lending rate minus average deposit rate) was equal to 6 percentage points. Three fourths of the available observations in our sample were referred to foreign owned institutions.
6.
The estimation results.
The set of regressions that we have just described appear to provide a qualified support to the descriptive evidence discussed in the first part of the paper. Although it is evident that our results should not be generalized to countries with different financial and regulatory structures, they detect behaviors often obscured by the higher noise that plagues data of multi-country panels.
The first two sets of regressions try to detect the effect of foreign ownership on cost efficiency. Table 9 reports the results of the effects on operating costs and Table 10 the impact on labor costs, as proxied by the number of banks' staff. Table 9 shows that, while operating costs appear to increase in the first two years following the acquisition by a foreign entity and decrease thereafter, such evidence is not statistically significant. The only significant foreign ownership variables are those, describing the foreign presence in the ruling bodies, showing that local management of foreign banks is most effective in reducing costs. These results are usefully complemented by those concerning the dynamics of labor costs presented in Table 10 , that shows a very significant reduction of labor costs (proxied by the number of bank staff per value of intermediated funds) in the first three years after the acquisition of control. Interestingly the reduction of labor costs is clearly related to the presence of a foreign owner and does not appear to be affected by the management style as described by the presence of domestic national in the banks' governing bodies. In fact, negative and strongly significant effects are present both in the case where a domestic and a foreign CEO manages the foreign owned institution. The summary evidence that can be drawn from these results is that foreign ownership is characterized by an immediate rationalization of labor costs that tends to be achieved in the first three years. The reduction in the numbers of employees, though, is generally offset by either higher wages or higher expenditures in new infrastructures, reducing the overall effects of a change of ownership -from domestic to foreign -on operating costs.
In addition, the costs of new infrastructures or more qualified workforce increases together with the presence of foreign elements in the governing bodies, while it is more effectively kept under control by domestic CEOs.
Do operating costs behave differently when the acquisition has been the result of the acquisition of a previously existing institution or of a greenfield investment? The answer, largely consistent with the descriptive evidence, is that greenfield investments are clearly associated with lower operating and labor costs than M&A operations, as
shown by the negative and significant coefficient of the greenfield variable both in the operating costs regression and in the bank staff regression (Table 14 , columns 1 and 2).
Let us now move to the analysis of the effects of foreign ownership on profit efficiency. The expected sign of foreign ownership on profits, here proxied by the return on assets (ROA), is not obvious a priori. On one side a more efficient production function and a better ability to diversify risks characterizes large foreign owners leading to a possible increase of profits, on the other the greater competition provided by the foreign presence may well reduce the position rents previously enjoyed by local institutions, pushing profits down. In addition, multinational entities may largely affect the results of foreign controlled subsidiaries through a policy of transfer prices intended to improve the risk-return profile at a global level 6 . For these different reasons empirical evidence is particularly important. We analyze profitability along two dimensions, exploring the effects of foreign ownership on both total profitability and the profitability associated with the lending activity, as measured by the average level of lending spreads.
The results relative to the ROA regressions are reported in Table 11 and show that profitability unambiguously increases with a positive progression in the first four years after a foreign acquisition. It also remains consistently positive in a longer horizon, as shown by the positive coefficient of the variable "number of years of foreign control".
The coefficients associated with domestic and foreign management suggest that a higher profitability is associated with domestic management, but none of the relevant coefficients is statistically significant indicating that management styles are here less relevant than on the cost side. In other words, foreign banks appear to have a considerably higher income generating capacity than domestic banks, and this allows them to largely offset a level of operating costs whose level, if not its composition, is similar to that of local banks. The substantial irrelevance of different management styles, suggests also that the higher revenues of foreign institutions is likely to be related to a larger panoply of financial services more than to a specific placing ability of traditional products where domestic managers may have a comparative advantage. Finally, the profitability of foreign investments is unambiguously and consistently higher for greenfield banks not only with respect to domestic institutions but also with respect to foreign banks acquired through M&A operations (Table 14 , column 3).
The results of the regressions of the lending spread (interest income/total interest generating assets-interest expenses/total interest bearing liabilities) support our previous conjectures concerning the source of foreign banks profitability. In fact, lending spreads are clearly negatively associated with foreign banks, and increasingly so as the years from in the acquisition elapse. The first significant coefficient is that associated with a period of at least four years of foreign control. The reduction of lending spreads is consistent with the general claim that foreign banks entry is conducive to a reduction of financial rents but indicates also that the observed higher bank profitability, discussed previously, does not come from higher margins on the intermediation activity and is presumably due to a larger panoply of financial services and a better quality of loan portfolios. Even assuming an elasticity of demand for bank loans higher than one the effects of a lower mark-up pricing on net interest income, according to our evidence,
should not be felt before four years from the foreign acquisition. All these consideration can be repeated with additional emphasis for green-field banks that not only show a higher ROA than the rest of the system but also, once they are separated from other foreign banks, show a significantly smaller spreads than the rest of the system 7 .
Our 
7.

Conclusions.
Our conclusions offer a considerably detailed view of the way foreign ownership affected banks' performance in Hungary, possibly sheding light on more general patterns.
A larger focus on details, though, may come at the cost of generality and therefore our conclusions should be very cautiously extended to different countries. Also, the number of observations available in the Hungarian case provide an upper bound to the efficiency and robustness of our results. Still, a country case analysis appears justified, in the case of Hungary, by the early start of the liberalization process that makes it possible to detect a sufficiently extended sample period in which bank decisions should not have been affected by other concurrent events such as major bank and financial reforms.
Independently from statistical robustness, caution in extrapolating our results is warranted for an other reason. As often happens to be the case for "early starters"
7 Green-field banks have been found to be associated with lower spreads also in a selection of Latin American countries by Martinez-Peria and Mody (2003) . This evidence may also be related to a composition effect by which green-field institutions carry a higher portion of business with corporate business where both spread and unit cost are lower than in the retail business Hungary may have effectively exploited a "window of opportunity" that may not necessarily be replicated for countries and banks following the Hungarian experience at a different point in time.
With all these caveats in mind, our results provide a consistent and detailed account of important features associated to foreign bank ownership. In general the evidence presented in this paper seems to support the notion that foreign banks independently from the nature of the original investment (greenfield investment or acquisition of control), of management styles and from the duration of ownership are pursuing a lending policy not dissimilar from that of domestic banks, after controlling for country level and bank level determinants of bank lending decisions. At the same time they are clearly able to achieve a consistently higher profitability. This evidence support the notion that foreign banks success is related to a product innovation, strictly tied to their ability to supply a broader array of financial services than their domestic competitors, and to a better screening and monitoring procedure of their loan applicants.
More importantly, the ability to achieve higher profitability levels is strictly related to the to the duration of their presence in the country and to the nature of the initial investment, with green-field banks clearly outpacing other foreign banks. In addition it emerges very clearly that increased profitability does not come from higher intermediation margins, which are in fact on average slightly decreasing overtime and whose negative impact on profits is probably only partly offset by increased lending.
Finally, while management style may not be clearly related to overall bank profitability levels, it is clearly related to the success of different strategies for achieving cost efficiency. On average for a given policy of rationalization of the work force domestic managers are considerably more effective in reducing operating costs than their foreign colleagues.
The bearing of our analysis on the political economy of foreign bank entry appear to be the following: the dynamic of foreign banks presence in a country is such that it is immediately associated to a reduction of employment and to higher profits than local banks. The two developments though are not directly associated, as foreign banks increase immediately the level of operating expenses (presumably to finance their restructuring efforts), offsetting the likely gains associated with a reduction of the labor force. More widely perceived benefits, such as a lower cost of credit, require few years to become apparent. While no contraction of credit is supported from our data we do not have evidence either of an aggressive lending policy that may reach larger layers of the population. Concluding, the most evident source of profits for foreign banks derives from their ability to access a richer menu of financial services and possibly by their more higher quality loan portfolio. This is a benefit that may not be immediately apparent to the larger public but that supports bank profits immediately from the first year of their establishment. For countries, such as Hungary, where foreign banks are involved not only in niche markets but in large commercial banks, the benefits are likely to be felt by a large, but not necessarily new, public of customers. The symbols ***, **, * indicate, respectively, a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5 per cent, and between 5 and 10 per cent. The symbols ***, **, * indicate, respectively, a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5 per cent, and between 5 and 10 per cent. The symbols ***, **, * indicate, respectively, a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5 per cent, and between 5 and 10 per cent. The symbols ***, **, * indicate, respectively, a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5 per cent, and between 5 and 10 per cent. The symbols ***, **, * indicate, respectively, a significance level smaller than 1 per cent, between 1 and 5 per cent, and between 5 and 10 per cent.
